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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
LOlJIS \V. COOPER 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Case No. 
THE INDUSrfRIAL CO~IMISSION 9931 
OF UT:\H, J\1:-\RCUS PLUJ\IBING 
.\ND HEATING, and THE STATE 
INSURANCE FUND, 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
\Ve agree \Vith that part of the Statement of Facts 
contained in the first paragraph of Plaintiff's Brief ( P .B. 
2. 3). \ Ve are not, however, in complete agreement with 
the remainder of the Statement of Facts as given by the 
Plaintiff, and we, therefore, desire to restate the facts as 
follows: 
Plaintiff \\·as employed by Marcus W. Johnson 
Plumbing and Heating as a laborer at Moab, Utah, on 
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November 21, 1961. (R. 1) On that day Plaintiff was 
doing the same kind of laboring work as he had done 
day in and day out, which consisted of manual labor 
in the handling and laying of sewer pipe. (R. 23-29) 
Plaintiff testified that he was lifting on one end of a piece 
of steel pipe. Two men were on the other end of the 
pipe which they were lifting over a pile of pipe. (R. 13) 
While he was lifting, Plaintiff got a catch in his back. 
He let the pipe down and "got another hold on it" and 
then continued to work. (R. 13) The catch was not 
disabling, as the Plaintiff was able to continue with his 
employment. (R. 13) He did not say anything at that 
time about having injured himself to Steven L. Kay, the 
foreman on the job. (R. 22) Nothing was said to Mr. 
Kay until the latter went to the Plaintiff's home to see 
why he did not report to work. This was after the second 
injury claimed by the Plaintiff. (R. 22-23) He continued 
working until the Thanksgiving holiday. (R. 14) After 
the holidays he worked for an addiitonal one or two 
days. At that time he was assisting with the setting of a 
length of concrete pipe. ( R. 14) The Plaintiff on the 
second occasion was only guiding the pipe into place. 
(R. 17) The only injury sustained by him on this occasion 
was that the ends of his fingers were scraped, bringing 
blood to the surface. (R. 17) No other injury was 
claimed for that occasion. 
At the time Plaintiff claims he was lifting the pipe 
on November 21st, he did not complain about pain in 
his groin. (R. 13) Five or six days later as he was taking 
a shower he found that his testicle had drawn up on 
him. ( R. 14) Plaintiff had suffered from prostate trouble, 
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3 
cirrhosis of the liver, hemorrhoids and diabetes. (R. 18-
19.) Defendants contend that Plaintiff did not sustain 
an accidental injury which was the cause of the Plain-
tiff's hernia. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF HAS NOT ESTABLISHED THAT 
HE SUSTAINED AN INJURY WHICH AROSE 
OUT OF OR IN THE COURSE OF HIS EMPLOY-
MENT. 
Plaintiff argues through his counsel that he has es-
tablished that an accident did arise out of and in the 
course of his employment. We submit that the facts do 
not support such a conclusion. 
Plaintiff claims that he sustained a hernia by reason 
of an accident occuring November 21, 1961. (R. 8) 
There is the additional claim that at the same time he 
sustained a back injury. This claim apparently was not 
pressed as the record seems to primarily concern the 
claim that Plaintiff sustained a hernia on said date. 
There is very little testimony relative to the back con-
dition. 
Plaintiff did not complain about having injured his 
back or groin on the occasion he and a companion were 
guiding a small concrete pipe into place. (R. 17) This 
occured after the Thanksgiving holiday. This injury in-
volved only the tearing of some skin from his hands or 
fingers. 
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If the Plaintiff had suffered a hernia as he was 
lifting one end of the corrugated pipe, ( R. 13), it \vould 
be logical to assume that Plaintiff would have noticed 
this physical ailment or condition at that time rather 
than five days later. The normal traumatic hernia is 
associated with nausea, inability to continue to work, 
and pain in the area affected. None of these elements of 
a compensable traumatic hernia were present on No-
vember 21, 1961, as far as the evidence appears in the 
record. Plaintiff did not find it necessary to discontinue 
work. He did not report his claimed in jury to his fore-
man, Steven L. Kay (R. 22) although Kay was working 
nearby. 
The first indication that the Plaintiff had of a hernia 
was after he had worked two days following the Thanks-
giving holiday. It was while taking a shower that he 
found he was having difficulty. (R. 14) 
The Plaintiff's case is weak because his testimony 
is not supported by the testimony of other employees, 
who were present at the time. According to Plaintiff's 
testimony ( R. 13) two men were on the other end of 
the corrugated pipe which Plaintiff claims he was lifting 
when he was injured. Neither of these fellow employees 
were called as witnesses. This would have been a simple 
and direct way to substantiate the claim. 
The Commission has the opportunity of seeing the 
witnesses and evaluating their testimony. The Court in 
john G. Hendrie Company vs. Industrial Commission 12 
Utah 2d 80, 362 P2d 752, at page 81 said, 
". . . that of believing the facts as related 
by the applicant widow and her witnesses. This 
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is a prerogative reserved to the Comission, with 
\vhich \\"e do not interfere short of arbitrary action 
not based on competent, believable evidence.'' 
Plaintiff was doing his regular work on September 
21, and again on the days he worked following the 
Thanksgiving holiday. On examination by the Referee, 
( R. 28 and 29) the following questions and answers 
. 
were gtven. 
By the Referee, 
Q. Was the work that you were doing on the 
21st day of November about the same type of 
work you were doing day in and day out? 
A. Yes, I have done mostly labor. 
Q. I mean handling pipe like you did on that 
day? 
A. Yes. We have had a lot of heavier pipe 
than that, as far as that goes." 
The Plaintiff did not testify as to anything unusual 
having occured. There was no slipping, falling or stumbl-
ing. Taking the testimony of Plaintiff at face value, all 
that can be said of it is that Plaintiff was doing the 
same that he had done each day, "day in and day out." 
This is not an accident. 
Plaintiff had physical ailments not related to his 
employment, cirrhosis of the liver, prostate trouble, (R. 
18-19) and "a 6th lumbar verterbra or a lumbralization 
of the first sacral vertebra." (R. 5) Dr. Morrow, in his 
report (R. 5) indicated that the back pain was of a 
minor nature and that there was no disc involvement. 
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In Smith vs. Industrial Commission 104 Utah 318, 
140 P2d 314, the court in considering the claim of Smith 
that he had suffered a hernia while he was working 
alone, and which alleged injury he did not report to his 
employer, said at page 323, the following, 
"The weakness of Plaintiff's case is that there 
is no evidence other than his own testimony that 
he had an accident, or the details of effects there-
of, and he is an interested witness. By the nature 
of the accident it is impossible to contradict his 
testimony. Such a situation presents an oppor-
tunity for imposition. A person who discovers he 
has a hernia can readily make up details of a 
story which would prove that it was caused by 
an accident in the course of his employment. Un-
der such circumstances he would naturally tell 
that it occured while he was alone, he would 
describe the usual symptoms when a hernia is 
caused and would make a plausible explanation 
of why he did not report it sooner. The person 
making such a fabrication can do so knowing that 
no one can directly contradict his testimony. Un-
der these circumstances would it be unreasonable 
for the commission to refuse to believe his story? 
"This question must be answered in the nega-
tive. Everyone recognizes that an interested wit-
ness is not entitled to as much credibility as one 
who is not interested.'' 
The evidence clearly shows that Plaintiff did not find 
it necessary to stop work following the lifting incident 
of September 21st. There is no claim that he sustained 
a hernia because of the second event where Plaintiff 
scraped his fingers. Plaintiff did not seek medical atten-
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tion immediately following the alleged lifting incident 
of September 21st. He did not report to his foreman. 
He was able to continue work. The fello\v employees who 
Pia in tiff claims were assisting with the lifting of the pipe, 
and who might have substantiated Plaintiff's claim, if it 
were true, did not testify. 
We submit that Plaintiff did not sustain the burden 
of proof necessary to substantiate his claim that he sus-
tained an injury arising out of or in the course of his 
employment. 
Inasmuch as considerable space in plaintiff's brief 
(P.B. 8-14) is devoted to an attempt to show that the 
evidence presented by the Plaintiff at the hearing is suf-
ficient to meet the tests set forth in Norris vs. Industrial 
Commission 90 Utah 256, 91 P2d 413, which would 
compel the court to hold that the Commission erred in 
its findings, we feel that a further discussion of that 
case and its applicability to the case now before the 
court is indica ted. 
To hold that the present case comes within the rule 
of the Norris case, it must be shown that as a matter of 
law the wrong conclusion was reached from the evidence 
presented. In contradiction to the argument of the Plain-
tiff, we do not believe that the evidence meets the re-
quirements of the Norris test. 
That case restates the well supported principle that 
it is for the Commission to resolve conflicts in the evi-
dence, for at page 415 Utah Report, the court said: 
"Again, therefore, we have the old case of a 
conflict of evidence which it is for the Commis-
sion to resolve." 
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That case has been cited repeatedly by this Court as 
authority to sustain the findings and orders of the Indus-
trial Commission. 
We will discuss the Norris tests as we see them ap-
plied to the testimony presented at the hearing before 
the Industrial Commission. 
(a) "The evidence must be uncontradicted." 
The fact that Plaintiff did not mention the claimed 
in jury to his foreman; ( R. 22) that he was able to con-
tinue work; (R. 13) and that the hernia was not dis-
covered by plaintiff for several days after the 21st of 
September contradicts Plaintiff's testimony that he sus-
tained a hernia on September 21st. 
(b) There must be nothing in the record 
which is intrinsically discrediting to the uncontra-
dicted testimony." 
Had Plaintiff sustained a traumatic hernia as claimed 
he would have felt pain, from the tearing of the tissues. 
It is not reasonable to suppose that he would have been 
able to continue with his work. 
(c) "The uncontradicted evidence must not 
be wholly that of interested witnesses and if from 
noninterested 'vitnesses the record must show no 
bias or prejudice on the part of such witnesses." 
The testimony of Steven L. Kay and Edward L. Neff 
does not sustain Plaintiff's testimony as they did not see 
what occured at the time of the Plaintiff's alleged "acci-
dent." The fellow employees who might have supported 
Plaintiff's testimony did not testify. 
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The case of Dole vs. Industrial Commission 115 Utah 
311, 204 P2d 462 is cited as holding that the rule requir 
ing that the uncontradicted evidence must not be wholly 
that of interested witnesses has been relaxed. 
The Dole case involved the claim of Dole, who was 
driving a truck to the Kearns Army Base, when the 
truck hit a rough spot in the road, causing it to bounce 
and to go temporarily out of control. When the truck 
righted itself, and the Plaintiff had recovered control, 
he discovered that the vision in his right eye was blurred 
and that he could not see clearly. 
The next morning Dole reported to his doctor. In 
the course of events, the claimant saw three doctors. 
The first doctor claimed that he could not remember 
the history as given by the Plaintiff. Dr. White, who 
later saw the claimant stated that he was given the 
details concerning the accident. A Seattle doctor, who 
later operated also confirmed the history. The Commis-
sion held against the claimant, the Supreme Court re-
versed the decision of the Commission and referred it 
back to the Commission for action not inconsistent with 
the opinion. 
The Dole can be distinguished from the instant case 
in that there was a clear accident, and in that Dole im-
mediately after the accident found that his eye was 
blurred. Dole went to a doctor immediately in an effort 
to find out what was wrong with his eye. 
In the present case nothing unusual happened, and 
the Plaintiff did not discover his hernia for five or six 
days later. Plaintiff did not go to a doctor until several 
days had passed. 
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It is also important to note that there was a strong 
dissent in this case. The decision was three to two. Chief 
Justice Pratt and Justice Wolfe concluded that there was 
sufficient evidence to sustain the conclusion of the Com-
. . 
miSSIOn. 
(d) "The uncontradicted evidence is such as 
to carry a measure of conviction to the reasonable 
mind and sustain the burden of proof." 
We cannot agree that the evidence presents a "Plau-
sible and not unusual occurence." We believe that the 
actions of the Plaintiff would have been decidedly dif-
ferent had he sustained a traumatic hernia. 
(e) "The uncontradicted evidence precludes 
any other explanation or hypothesis as being 
more or equally as reasonable." 
The Plaintiff's testimony showed that he was doing 
no more than usual work. There was no unusual incident 
or accident. (R. 28-29) The probable explanation is 
that Plaintiff's condition was one of long standing. 
(f) "There must be no indication in the rec-
ord that the presence of the witnesses gave the 
Commission such an advantage that its conclu-
sions should not be disturbed for that reason." 
Certainly in this as in all cases, the trier of the fact 
had the opportunity to see the witness and evaluate his 
testimony. 
We do not believe that Norris tests were met by the 
testimony presented, nor that the Plaintiff by the evi-
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dence presented established that he sustained an injury 
arising out of or in the course of his employment. 
POINT II 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION DID NOT 
ACT ARBITRARILY OR UNREASONABLY IN 
NOT REFERRING THE CLAIM TO A MEDICAL 
PANEL. 
We must agree with the statement in Plaintiff's brief 
that the "Plaintiff must establish that he was injured" 
by accident arising out of or in the course of his employ-
ment ( P .B. page 6) . We cannot agree to the conclusion 
reached thereafter. 
It is argued that inasmuch as medical testimony was 
not allowed at the hearing of the matter before the Com-
mission that Plaintiff was not permitted to fully present 
his case. 
Section 35-1-45, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, says: 
"Every employee . . . who is in jured . . . by 
accident arising out of or in the course of his em-
ployment, . . . shall be entitled to receive and 
shall be paid such compensation .... " 
The Commission must first determine if there was 
an accident within the meaning of the Workmen's 
Compensation Act. If the Commission should find after 
hearing the testimony of the Applicant and any other 
\vitnesses who might be called to testify that no "acci-
dent" had occured then it is not necessary to refer the 
medical aspects of the case to a Medical Panel for to 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
do so would be a useless thing. If there has been a deter-
mination that there has not been an accident the pri-
mary leg of a successful claim has collapsed. 
The Commission after hearing the evidence, found: 
"Applicant was performing the same type of 
work on the day of the alleged injury as he had 
performed day in and day out prior to November 
21, 1961. He was doing nothing unusual. The 
mere occurence of pain during the hours of em-
ployment and on the premises is not an accident. 
Applicant must prove by at least a preponderence 
of evidence, that something unusual, other than 
occurence of pain took place. Applicant's work 
was not unusual." (R. 30) 
Plaintiff's contention that he has not been given a 
fair hearing because there was no medical testimony 
given falls on another ground, which is that Plaintiff did 
testify as to the medical aspects of the case when he 
testified that his "right testicle had drawn up inside 
him" (R. 19), and that he had received a "catch" and 
had to lower the pipe. ( R. 13) This testimony was suf-
ficient to advise the Industrial Commission of the nature 
of Plaintiff's complaint. 
The file of the Commission also contained the Sur-
gical Report of Doctor R. R. Rutt, (R. 2) and the report 
of Doctor Robert E. Morrow. (R. 5-6) Certainly these 
reports fully informed the commission of the medical 
aspects of the claim. There was no dispute as to whether 
or not Plaintiff had a hernia. No further offer of medical 
evidence was made by the Plaintiff. See the reecnt Utah 
Case of Pearl A. Long, wife of William T. Long, de-
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ceasfd vs. H'cJtern .\'tates Refining Company, et al. No. 
9867, filed September 16, 1~)63. 
I lad the Commission found after the hearing that 
there \Vas an accident arising out of and in the course 
of the Plaintiff's employment, then had there been con-
troverted medical questions it would have been proper 
and necessary for the Commission to refer the claim to 
a l\fcdical Panel for the purpose of determining whether, 
from the medical aspects of the case, the "accident'~ 
found by the Commission was the cause of or contributed 
to the Plaintiff's physical condition. 
Section 35-1-77 U.C.A. 1953 as amended begins as 
follows: 
"Upon the filing of a claim for compensa-
tion for in jury by accident, or for death, arising 
out of or in the course of employment, and where 
the employer or insurance carrier denies liability, 
the Commission shall refer the medical aspects of 
the case to a medical panel appointed by the 
C 0 0 ,, ommtsston .... 
We submit that undoubtedly the legislative intent 
\vas that if there were any controversial medical ques-
tions involved then the matter should be referred to a 
~fedical Panel. The Commission having found that the 
Plaintiff had not sustained an accidental injury within 
the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act it was 
not necessary for the file to be referred to a panel of 
medical doctors. 
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POINT III 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S FIND-
INGS OF FACTS ARE CONCLUSIVE AND FINAL. 
It is the duty of the Industrial Commission to make 
findings of fact and conclusons of law. These duties are 
clearly set out in the Workmen's Compensation Act of 
our State. 
Section 35-1-85 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, reads: 
"After each formal hearing, it shall be the 
duty of the Commission to make findings of fact 
and conclusions of law in writing and file the 
same with its secretary. The findings and conclu-
sions of the Commission on questions of fact shall 
be conclusive and final and shall not be subject 
to review; such questions of fact shall include 
ultimate facts and the findings and conclusions 
of the Commission." 
This question has been ruled upon many times by 
this court. In the case of Norris vs. Industrial Commis· 
sion, 90 Utah 256, 61 P2d 413, the Court restated the 
well supported rule that it is for the Commission to 
resolve conflicts in the evidence and to be the final 
arbiter in the facts. The Court's opinion contains the 
following at page 260. 
"Again, therefore, we have the old case of a 
conflict of evidence which it is for the Commission 
to resolve."***** 
The legislature, has in effect, said : 
"The Commission is the final Arbiter of the 
facts. If there is error in judgment or conclusions 
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of or from the facts, it must be the Commission's 
error and remain there. We give the Supreme 
Court the right to speak only by warrant of law 
in compensation cases when it speaks in reference 
to errors of law alleged to have been made by 
the Commission.'' 
In the case of Park Uath Consolidated Mines Com-
pany vs. The Industrial Commission, 84 Utah 481, 36 
P2d 972, the Court said in part at page 488 : 
". . . in the determining of facts the conclu-
sions of the Commission are like a verdict of a 
jury, and will not be interfered with by this Court 
when supported by some substantial evidence." 
In the case of Holland vs. Industrial Commission of 
Utah, 5 Utah 2nd 105, 297 P2d, 230, this Court said at 
page 106, 
". . . the Commission was not obliged to be-
lieve this testimony. Smith v. Industrial Commis-
sion 104 Utah 318, 140 P.2d 314. This being so 
this Court cannot say as a matter of law that it 
was unreasonable for the Commission to have 
found as a fact from all the evidence before it, 
that Plaintiff's ailment was not caused by an acci-
dent and since the Commission's findings are 
binding on this Court unless it can be shown as 
a matter of law that they are so unreasonable as 
to be arbitrary or capricious, this Court cannot 
do otherwise than affirm its decision." 
In a recent case, Burton vs. Industrial Commission, 
13 Utah 2d 553, 374 P2d 439, this court said at page 554, 
"In order to reverse the finding and order 
made the Plaintiff must show that there is such 
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credible uncontradicted evidence in her favor that 
the Commission's refusal to so find was capri-
cious and arbitrary." 
The Court in denying the Plaintiff's claim for com-
pensation in Kent vs. Industrial Commission 89 Utah 
381, 57 P2d 724, gave an excellent summary of the 
courts responsibility when asked to review a decision of 
of the Industrial Commissions. At pages 384 and 385 the 
Court had the following to say, 
When the Industrial Commission denies com-
pensation and the case is brought to this court 
for review, a different type of search of the record 
is demanded than when the Industrial Commis-
sion makes an award of compensation and the 
record is likewise brought here for review. 
In the denial of compensation, the record must 
disclose that there is material, substantial, com-
petent, uncontradicted evidence sufficient to make 
a disregard of it justify the conclusion, as a mat-
ter of law, that the Industrial Commission arbi-
trarily and capriciously disregarded the evidence 
or unreasonably refused to believe such evi-
dance.***** 
When we are asked to overturn the findings 
and conclusions of the commission denying com-
pensation it must be made clearly to appear that 
the commission acted wholly without cause in re-
jecting or in refusing to believe or give effect to 
the evidence. It was not intended by the Work-
men's Compensation Act that this court, in mat-
ters of evidence, should to any extent substitute 
the judgment of the court upon factual matters 
for the judgment of the commission." 
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We submit that under the statute and cases above 
cited that the Industrial Commission's findings of fact 
arc conclusive and final and should not be interfered 
\Vi th by the Court. 
CONCLUSION 
\Vc submit that the Industrial Commission properly 
conducted its proceedings in the matter, and from the 
evidence reached the correct conclusion. The decision 
and order of the Commission should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. PRATT KESLER, 
Attorney General~ 
CHARLES WELCH, JR. 
Attorney for Defendants 
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